The Festungen, Part II

September of 1944 brought what the Germans came to think of as the “Miracle in the West” . . . a reversal of failing German fortunes, a sudden stiffening of German resistance along the Westwall, and a sudden loss of allied momentum as overstretched allied supply lines brought armored and motorized columns to a halt.

But this was no true miracle so much as it was a predictable consequence of the laws of warfare – high rates of advance by a victorious force cannot be maintained indefinitely. Even so, the allied forces arrived at the German border with enough force, and supplies for at least limited thrusts, that a lack of German resistance could have spelled an early end for the Third Reich. Given that the German forces in the west had been severely thrashed in the fighting in Normandy (most particularly in the Falaise Gap), it is not immediately clear to the casual reader of history just which elements of the German forces so energetically manned the Westwall and barred an easy entry into Germany.

The German forces were a hodge-podge of ravaged units retreating out of France and Belgium, Alarm units rushed forward, hastily-formed divisions created from Ersatzheer (Replacement Army) formations, and, most significantly, something like 100 battalions of fortress troops. While not a war-winning team, these German units manned the Westwall with enough troops to prevent the allies from easily penetrating this fortified line in the late summer of 1944. Allied troops noticed the change quickly: whereas before their patrols had shown stretches of the Westwall to be unmanned, suddenly the bunkers had occupants and German troops were darting between positions in the trenches connecting bunkers.

The reality was that the German line was weak – but in this case, so were the allies confronting them. The allied forces were at the end of their logistical tether – short on gasoline, large-caliber munitions for artillery, and riflemen (the last shortage a consequence of faulty estimations of infantry casualties that would be incurred in Normandy). Allied vehicles were worn out after the pursuit across France, and in any case, direly short of needed gasoline. While the allies sorted out their logistical problems, and in some cases, bulled ahead against furious German resistance, the Germans worked to convert their patchwork manning of the Westwall into a cohesive line of resistance behind which the battered Panzer divisions took shelter so that they could rebuild their striking power.

About the time the allies finally reestablished solid lines of supply to all areas of the front line, a breakthrough occurred – but it was the German forces who were attacking, some 26 divisions strong, in the Ardennes! A grueling five weeks followed in which the German attack into the Ardennes was blunted and repelled, and in which a subsequent German offensive into Alsace resulted in very bitter fighting for the U. S. Seventh Army and the French First Army. These dual offensives by the German forces in the winter of 1944/45 would have seemed the wildest of fantasies to the allies as they approached the Westwall in September, 1944. The key to the transformation that occurred was the Westwall itself, and the fortress troops who contributed the equivalent of 15 divisions of German troops to securing the line. Behind this fortified shield, Hitler rebuilt his Panzer forces and then struck the allied line in places where the allied forces were thinly manned.

And the Westwall was not particularly mighty – most bunkers had been built for pre-war weapons and could not house the larger antitank guns being used by the Germans in 1944. But the Westwall could provide positions of reinforced concrete and large stretches of ground filled with antitank obstacles, whose efficiency was every bit as high in 1944 as they had been in 1939. Although the Germans lacked adequate mobile reserves to secure a fortified line in September 1944, the relative weakness of the allied forces confronting the Westwall meant the line could, in most cases, hold the allies at bay. And so, the Westwall bought Germany five more months with which to resist, for after arriving in front of the line in September 1944, it was not until February 1945 that the Westwall was penetrated in enough places to seriously endanger its value as a defensive work. Once again, an old technique of warfare, fortifications, had proved their worth in an era defined by the swift movement of armored forces and the high-pitched whine of dive bombers bearing down upon the enemy.

The fortress units themselves were slowly integrated into regular German divisions, and thus served as a ready source of combat replacements. From apparently nowhere, over 100 battalions of specialist troops had rapidly manned a fortified line – and bought the Reich enough time to muster powerful counter-strokes against those forces seeking to consign the Reich to the realm of history. It was not the first rabbit that Germany pulled out a hat during the war, and it would not be the last. For the allies, it was a bitter lesson that meant defeating Germany implied defeating the entire German army; school troops, cripples, teenagers, all – and not just defeating the combat elements of the regular ground troops.

Next: Festungen in the east